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PRELAUNCH PROCESSING SCIENTIFIC PAYLOADS SINCE
CHALLENGER; LESSONS LEARNED EXERCISE

R. L. Schuilinq

NASA f John F. Kennedy Space Center

INTRODUCTION

The Kennedy Space Center is responsible for processing a large
number of payloads for integration and launch with the Space
Shuttle. The processing of unclassified Shuttle mission payloads
is the responsibility of the KSC Payload Management and Operations Directorate and its NASA-McDonnell Douglas personnel.
Each individual STS mission may involve several payload elements
such as deployable satellites, upperstages, free flying platforms, scientific instrument carriers, as well as flight support
equipment. As of this writing, 1990 will see the KSC payload
processing organizations supporting the launch and/or download of
fifteen different payload elements on eight separate STS launches .
The variety of payloads processed and the lack of similarity
among successive mission processing flows provides a rich opportunity to utilize the experiences Q'f the past flows to enhance
the payload processing team's future operational activities. The
payload processing teams have taken this opportunity to engage,
therefore, in some effort to retain the corporate knowledge
acquired on each of the STS missions, and to attempt to collect
that knowledge in an accessible knowledge base. To that end, a
"lessons learned 11 effort forms a part of each of the payload
processing operations.
LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS
The organization which is charged with the responsibility for the
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actual on-line processing of a particular mission's payloads is
the "test team" . This team is an ad hoc organization composed of
KSC NASA and contractor payload processing personnel, orbiter
personnel involved in payload-relevant activity, resident members
of the payload developer team, quality, safety, security, and
other support area representatives. The test team is a forum for
discussing status, planning, and concerns regarding the particular STS mission payload processing. It meets at increasingly
frequent intervals during the payload prearrival planning and
daily during the actual payload processing operations.
Following the mission, the test team members meet to conduct a
lessons learned exercise. The overall thrust of this exercise is
operational in nature. Forms are provided to the test team members on which problems encountered during the processing operation are outlined and the reporting individual proposes a solution which would preclude the recurrence of the problem on future
payload processing flows.
The test team then meets in a special session to review each of
these concerns. The actual problem is reviewed, causes identified, actions to preclude recurrence are identified, and the
individual lesson learned is incorporated into a database.
MISSIONS SINCE STS-51L

As of the writing date of this paper, there have been seven Space
Shuttle launches since the post-51L return to flight. Three of
these have been classified Department of Defense flights. This
paper deals with the remaining four; STS-26R, STS-29R, STS-30R,
and STS-30.
The STS-26R mission, launched on September 29, 1988, payload was
the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite TDRS-C and its Inertial
Upper Stage (IUS)booster. Total KSC processing time was 137 days.
The next mission, STS-29R, consisted of the TDRS-D satellite and
its IUS booster together with the Space Station Heat Pipe Advanced Radiator Element (SHARE) . The TDRS-D was at KSC for 104
days and Share for 183 days prior to the March 13, 1989 launch.
The STS-30R mission was a planetary probe and consisted of the
Magellan Venus satellite and its IUS booster. The spacecraft was
integrated by its developers in an off-line facility and KSC
processing began at the Vertical Processing Facility (VPF) on
February 15, 1989. Launch was May 4, 1989 after 93 days of KSC
payload processing.
The Galileo was powered by two Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG) Units. Due to the nature of these units, they had to
be installed on the spacecraft after it was installed in the
orbiter at the launch pad. This operation required the use of two
large specially-built platforms. It was determined that a fit
check of these platforms at the pad, together with an installa-
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tion handling exercise using an RTG simulator would be required.
Since this mission would be the first to use RTGs on the Shuttle
and the first use of the platforms, this exercise was treated as
a separate flow and the lessons learned operation was conducted
on this operation separately from STS-34. It is also presented
separately in this paper. The actual exercise took place during
the period of May 17-22, 1989, although planning had preceded
the operation for several months.
CATEGORIZATION OF INCIDENTS

The incidents identified in the Lessons Learned process for the
above missions have been categorized by their primary characteristic features. These have fallen into three major categories and
one minor. The major categories are incidents involving an operational, documentation, or hardware feature. A minor area was
software which was noted on only one STS mission's exercise.
Within these categories, the incidents were subcategorized to
identify more specific features. These are described and examples
given in the following section.
OPERATIONAL CATEGORY

Support Required; Incidents displaying this feature were characterized by the absence or inadequacy of support for some operational activity. Example; Parts required to support an STS-26R
orbiter-payload interface link check were not kitted and available for pickup one day prior to the test.
Coordination; The lack of coordination between organizations was
a feature of over one quarter of the incidents identified. Example; Payload personnel were not notified of a constraint which
prevented starting the above STS-26R payload-orbiter interface
link test until just prior to beginning the planned checks.
Planning/Scheduling; Inadequate planning for an operation or
conflicting scheduling was noted in these incidents. Example
Periodic recertifications of STS-34 IUS initiator components at a
vendor site revealed concerns with possible major .impacts to the
operation due to lack of access to the components following
spacecraft-booster integration. Had the certification checks been
scheduled earlier the preintegration access would have been
available.
Inter-Organizational; Incidents identified in this subcategory
involved some inter-organizational aspect. Example; During IUS
testing on STS-34 the IUS took unexpected telemetry hits when the
orbiter updated its GMT.
Intra-Organizational; Incidents also, in some cases, featured
intra-organizational aspects. Example; The payload processing
organization material support group was not advised of an STS-26R
documented requirement to provide a backup static gun to support
pad operations
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DOCUMENTATION CATEGORY

Operational Documents: Documents involved were primarily operational in nature, rather than test or requirement documents.
Example: During STS-34 the J-hooks required to support flight
hardware at the Vertical Processing Facility were not available
for installation per schedule as they had not been called out in
the correct document.
Test Documents; This subcategorization involved documents used
for test activities. Example For the checkout of an STS-26R
payload-orbiter interface some copies of the test document had
revision numbers on all pages while other copies had them only on
the revised pages; leading to confusion as to what was the latest
document revision.
Requirement Documents; These incidents involved documentation of
requirements. Example: On STS-26R the cognizant requirements
document did not include intercommunication system channels for
the support of mechanical handling operations.
Incorrect/Incomplete; Incidents in this subcategories involved
documentation with errors or with incomplete sections. These were
not noted in reviews and were noted only when they caused an
impact to the activities they controlled. Example; For the STS26R Mission Sequence Test an unexpected ordnance test set timer
event failure was reported. It was discovered that this could
occur at any time and future editions of the document were annotated to indicate possible recurrence.
Not Available: These incidents featured documentation which was
not available or present when required to support an activity.
Example: Patching configurations in support of an STS-26R test
were done incorrectly and the quality control inspector on station did not have a copy of the relevant document.
Improper Use; The use of documentation to control activities
requires a standardized approach to the use of documentation for
specific types of tasks. In some instances this approach was not
followed. Example; During integrated testing on STS-26R the
problem report paperwork used for trouble shooting was allowed to
control portions of the operation, rather than using the controlling document. This leads to "nested" problem reports of unrelated problems on one report with a lack of trouble shooting and
operational accountability.
Requirement Unclear; In some cases, although the writer probably
understood what he meant, the document's ultimate user did not.
Example; During STS-26R pad operations confusion existed over the
requirement for hands-on activity to cease when humidity levels
fell below a given level.
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HARDWARE CATEGORY

Flight Hardware: In several cases the incidents involved actual
flight hardware. Example; During the STS-30R countdown the Magellan spacecraft command receiver locked up on S band commands
meant for the orbiter when the uplink went from low power (2 kw)
to high power (10 kw) mode. Since Galileo used the same receiver
this was a concern on both STS-30R and STS-34.
Ground Support Equipment (GSE) ; For those incidents involving
hardware, the majority involved difficulties with equipment which
was required to support the prelaunch processing but which was
not flight equipment itself. Example;The Magellan spacecraft
power cables were not compatible with KSC facilities and adapter
cables had to be developed to support Magellan operations.
Facilities: In addition to flight and GSE hardware, in several
incidents the facility in which the operation was being carried
out had an impact due to failures or inadequacies of its systems.
Example; During the STS-34 operations at the VPF an elevator door
transformer overheated and produced a noticeable odor. As the
Galileo was loaded with hypergolic fuels at the time any unidentified odor required evacuating the building and evaluations by
environmental health sniff checks prior to resuming operations.
Hardware Found to be Damaged: Some hardware elements were found
to be damaged when they were received for use. Example; During
the RTG Simulated installation exercise the platform which had
been developed to support the operation was noted as having
severe bends on stair treads, indicative of the metal having
local yielding.
Hardware Damaged by Use; In some cases, the hardware elements
were damaged by their use. Example; Following a stress corrosion
modification the J-hooks which would support the STS-34 payload
in the test stand were proofloaded, during which activity the
adjustment mechanism of the J-hooks was deformed.
Modification Required; In a number of incidents hardware elements
were found to be undamaged but to require some modification for
their effective usage. Example On STS-29R following cleaning,
leak checks, and certification of the TDRS propellant facility
fill line, there was no way to verify blanket pressure in the
line without a modification to add a pressure gauge in the line.
SOFTWARE CATEGORY

Incorrect Software; Some software was found to require modification. Example: Starting dates for operations on STS-26R were
found to be inconsistent between the payload integrated control
schedule and the open-items status reporting mechanism. A software change was found to be necessary to eliminate this source of
confusion.
Incorrect Usage; in one case the software's correct usage was not

fully understood by the test personnel. Example; During STS-26R
testing an unexpected payload data interleaver decom-fail message
was received although other indications did not support the fact
of a failure. Later understanding lead to documentation annotation to explain the cause and note it as not being a problem.
CATEGORIZATION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation of the Lessons Learned incidents by the mission
test team involved recommendation for the future. The objective
of these was the avoidance of future repetitions of the same type
of incident. These recommendations could be characterized by
certain basic approaches or features. These are described as a
factor of the relevant incident category for which they were
developed and examples given as follows.
OPERATIONAL CATEGORY

Admonitory: Recommendations for the future having this characteristic were primarily in the forms of warnings and cautionary
statements. The recommendations state, in effect, "this was an
error and the action required is to be aware of it and not to
repeat the error". The action is educational rather than calling
for a specific activity. Example; During the STS-30 processing a
backlog of trouble shooting problem reports built up requiring a
large amount of time to clear the documentation and process paper
resulting in a request for systems engineers to complete and
clear their paperwork in a more timely manner.
Modify Documentation ; Recommendations of this type dealt with
incidents in which the documentation process as such was not the
causative factor, however by modifying the relevant documentation
the operation could be enhanced. Example; During the RTG simulation the developer's GSE was prechecked by KSC quality before
going to the launch pad. This minimized potential impacts to the
operation at the pad and was incorporated into the document for
future simulations and actual RTG installations.
Modify Operation By modifying the operational approach the causative factor in these cases could be prevented. Example; Personnel
performing nonintegrated tasks at the pad on STS-26R did not
notify the payload pad leader of their presence, activities, or
problems leading to operational confusion. The recommended action
was for the payload pad leader to be designated as the main point
of contact so as to have a coordinated payload operation at all
times.
Modify Support; In these instances, modifying the character of
the support was recommended. Example; During the RTG simulation
malfunctioning communications boxes delayed portions of the
activity such that the operational support was modified to include portable contingency communications boxes as well as a
preoperational check of those present.
Establish Study Effort; Incidents characterized by this type of
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recommendation were such that the optimal course of approach was
not immediately apparent. Therefore, it was considered prudent to
convene a group of personnel to study the situation and to determine that approach. Example; During STS-26R it was found that
photographic support was uncoordinated, in conflict with various
organizations, and of poor quality. It was determined that a
working group was required so that the relevant organizations
could coordinate this activity and establish operating relations.
DOCUMENTATION CATEGORY

Revise the Document; Such incidents required modification to the
cognizant documentation, its distribution, or its application.
Example: Some tests, such as orbiter-interface, mission sequence,
or end-to-end, are performed on successive mission flows. Since
the document authors tend to clone documents from past flows they
have to be cautioned to remove inapplicable mission-specific
items which may be inadvertently included.
Revise Document Review Effort: This approach involved the education of offsite personnel in the method and effort required in
the review process. Example: The personnel on STS-34 did not
always fully understand the significance of test and operations
document reviews and did not always support them with the necessary individuals such that the review process had to be modified
at a late date to obtain fully reviewed documents.
HARDWARE CATEGORY

Modify Hardware: The relevant hardware required specific modification to preclude future incidents. Example: On STS-34 a pad
hoist leaked oil on the spacecraft sunshade and the hoist was
modified with a diaper arrangement to preclude a recurrence.
Repair Hardware: The damaged hardware required repair. Examples;
On STS-30R and -34 VPF facility systems broke down and required
repair before the operations could be resumed.
SOFTWARE CATEGORY

Modify Software; The relevant software required modification.
Example; On STS-26R a TDRS data drop out occurred due to the
program having the wrong configuration and the software was
modified to deal with this.
Modify Software Use In one case the correct usage of the software
was noted and documentation annotated as described above.
BASIC DATA SET

The tables below provide the basic set of numerical data based
upon the above characterizations of the incidents and of the
recommendations. These are provided in both numbers of incidents
and in the form of percentages.
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STS FLIGHT

LESSONS LEARNED EVALUATED
PER STS MISSION

STS-26R

STS-29R

116

16

STS-30R

RTG
SIM

STS-34

TOTAL

37

231

37

25

TABLE I

Individual Lessons Learned Identified and Evaluated
as a Function of STS Mission

Table I presents the total "lessons learned" identified by the
test teams as a function of the individual flows. STS-26R, as the
first flight in several years, was characterized by the highest
number of incidents. STS-29R was basically a repetition of STS26R from a payload viewpoint and had the least. The other three
orocessina ©Derations had roughly similar levels of incidents.
STS-26R

STS FLIGHT

INCIDENT CATEGORIES

STS-29R

STS-30R

RTG
SIM

8T8-34

TOTAL

NUMBE R/ PE RC ENT AG E OF INCIDENTS PER MISSION PROCESSING FLOW

OPERATIONAL

Support Required
Coordination
Planning/Scheduling
Inter-Organizational
Intra-Organizational

18/15.5
32/27.6
14/12.1
29/25.0
9/ 7.8

3/18.8
4/25.0
2/12.5
6/37.4
~

7/28.0
6/24.0
5/20.0
2/8.0
-

4/10.8
5/13.5
3/8.1
5/13.5
1/2.7

8/21.6
15/40.5
3/8.1
9/24.3
2/5.4

40/17.3
62/26.8
27/11.7
51/22.0
12/5.2

14/12.1
17/14.7
14/12.1
28/24.1
2/1.7
6/5.2
8/6.9

5/31.3
1/6.3
6/37.4
""

3/12.0
3/12.0
1/4.0
5/20.0
~

13/35.1
1/2.7
13/35.1
1/2.7

7/18.9
6/16.2
2/5.4
7/18.9
3/8.1
1/2.7

42/18.2
26/11.3
19/8.2
59/25.2
5/2.2
7/3.0

4/3.4
8/6.9
2/1.7
1/1.0
3/2.6
7/6.0

1/6.3
1/6.3
2/12.5
3/18.8

1/4.0
2/8.0
2/8.0
3/12.0

13/35.1
2/5.4
1/2.7
10/27.0

2/5.4
2/5.4
1/2.7
1/2.7
1/2.7

6/2.6
26/11.3
10/4.3
3/1.3
4/1.7
24/10.4

"

*"

4/1.7
I/. 4

DOCUMENTATION

Operational Document
Test Document
Requirement Document
Incorrect/Incomplete
Not Available
Improper Use
Requirement Unclear
HARDWARE

Flight
G8E

Facility
Hardware Found Damaged
Hardware Damaged by Use
Modification Required
SOFTWARE

Incorrect Software
Incorrect Usage

4/3.4
1/1.0

"

*

9/3.9

TABLE II

Numbers and Percentages Per Mission Processing Flow of
Lessons Learned Documented as a Function of Incident
Area for Each Mission Flow and the Total

Table II presents the characteristics of the incidents with
respect to the individual processing flows for the various categories of incident. In addition to the number format, the data is
also presented in a percentage format for each processing flow.
It should be noted that some incidents may exhibit two characteristics. An incident may also have inter-organizational aspects as
well as coordination aspects. A documentation incident may have
operational aspects as well as incomplete aspects. Therefore, the
numbers of characteristics should not total to the incident total
in Table I nor should the percentages per mission total to 100.
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8TS-26R

STS PLIGHT

STS-29R

RTG
SIM

STS-34

TOTAL

NUMBER/ PERCENTAGE OP RECOMMENDED ACTIONS PER
MISSION PROCESSING FLOW

INCIDENT CATEGORY
RECOMMENDED ACTIONS

OPERATIONAL
Admonitory
Modify Documentation
Modify Operation
Modify Support
Establish Study Effort

63/54.3
9/7.8
20/17.2
2/1.7
11/9.5

9/56.3

DOCUMENTATION
Revise Document
Revise Review Effort

27/23.3
1/1.0

HARDWARE
Modify Hardware
Repair Hardware

27/6.0
1/5.2

SOFTWARE
Modify Software
Revise Software Use

STS-30R

4/3.4
1/1.0

13/52. 0
1/4.0
11/44. 0
1/4.0

6/16.2
2/5.4
5/13.5
1/2.7
7/18.9

23/62.2
3/8.1
14/37.8
1/2.7
1/2.7

114/49.4
15/6.5
54/23.4
5/2.2
19/8.2

5/31.3

4/16. 0
1/4.0

13/35.1

5/13.5
1/2.7

55/23.8
2/.9

3/18.8

4/16. 0

11/29.7
1/2.7

1/2.7
1/2.7

26/11.3
6/3.5

-

4/1.7
I/. 4

4/25.0

-

-

-

TABLE III

Numbers and Percentages Per Mission Processing Flow of
Recommended Actions as a Function of Incident Category

Table III provides the numerical and percentage data for the
recommended actions for each of the STS missions discussed. As
with the incidents themselves, the recommended actions are cate
gorized in the same three major and one minor (software) areas.
Also, more than one characteristic may apply to a specific inci
dent's recommendation such that the numerical total per mission
should not necessarily equal the incident total in Table I nor
should the percentages total 100 per mission.
OBSERVATIONS

Consistently, the major area flagged by the lessons learned
process appears to be that of coordination, which was a concern
in approximately one quarter of the lessons learned incidents.
Also, the inter-organizational aspect is a far more prevalent
factor than inter-organizational. Incomplete or incorrect documentation is also a major area of concern. Together with coordination concerns, these two areas accounted for over half of the
incidents.
Although they do not form a large number of incidents, it is
noted, that facility systems failures occurred on each mission
with two failures on each of the missions,
In the recommended actions area it is noteworthy that approximately half involved admonitory measures. This would involve
warnings, cautions, or requests to "be advised 11 of the threats in
a number of situations. A concern with such types of remedial
activities is that they are basically heuristic in nature and it
is difficult to track the results. Also difficult to track are
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the study effort recommendations. No mechanism is set up to track
these two types of recommendations to determine if they were, or
are, being followed.
the
Revisions to documents were flagged in almost a third of damincidents noted. As with recommendations to fix something
approach
after-the-fact
an
basically
is
action
of
type
this
aged,
rather than preventat ive.
The lessons learned exercise appears to reinforce the idea that
operational payload processing is primarily an area where individuals 1 experiences on the job and past exposure to operations
determine how successful they may be in the future. To that end,
the formal lessons learned process has great potential in educating personnel in the subject of payload operations.
The lessons learned process at present, however, suffers from its
being a non-structured and non-rigorous program. The participanot.
tion of the test team members may be enthusiastic or it may
The main objective of the test team is to process a given mission
payload and the lessons learned exercise may be considered only
ic
individualist
ancillary. The test team itself is subject to
factors and to demands on its time such that the lessons learned
comhaving
Also,
little.
or
emphasis
much
receive
may
process
pleted the gathering of lessons learned, the compilation into toa
data base is often of low priority. In addition, little effort
analyze the cumulative lessons may be present, on.
It must also be noted that test team personnel are not knowledgeable in operations analysis nor statistical research. It may be
presumptuous to expect them to be as enthusiastic or as effective
as professional analysts of operational activity might be.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The lessons learned process has the potential of being an extremely effective educational tool in payload processing operations. The emphasis on individual experience which may be passed
on through this process and the scarcity of any organized training in operations as such, make it a valuable tool if it is
utilized. At present it does not appear to be utilized - rather
it is one more task for the test teams to complete. A major
causative factor in this is simply the lack of contractor or NASA
personnel resources to carry out effective data collection and
analysis.
The potential benefits of an effective, consistent, and organized
evaluation of these experiences, however, suggest that a vigorous
prosecution of the concept may pay dividends far in excess of the
cost. This is true especially if trained researchers and analysts
are involved. It is therefore suggested that a professional
operations research entity be used in conjunction with the test
teams to structure, conduct, analyze, and provide the results of
the payload processing lessons learned program in the future.
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